A note on solution concepts for nontransferable utility games
AbstractWhile many game-theoretic solution concepts pertain to conditions of transferable utility (TU), market transactions and other exchanges generally occur under nontransferable utility (NTU). Extant solutions translate TU solution concepts to the NTU case by utilizing endogenously determined utility weight vectors, which can violate notions of equity. A new solution procedure is developed that resolves this longstanding problem, and an existence proof is provided.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
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