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Impacts of hegemony and shifts in dominance on marine capture fisheries

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  • Blasiak, Robert
  • Yagi, Nobuyuki
  • Kurokura, Hisashi

Abstract

Catch data indicates that the world’s 25 largest marine capture fisheries have generally comprised some 40–50% of the total annual reported catch (1950–2012). From a game theory perspective, there is considerable diversity across these 25 fisheries, both in terms of the number of players and the management paradigms. Here, a dominance-oriented classification system is proposed, according to which fisheries are categorized into: (1) hegemonic systems with single-player dominance; (2) coupled systems with two-player dominance; (3) group systems with shared dominance; (4) systems with no dominant player. Among these categories, the fourth represents perhaps the greatest challenge to sustainable management, while also demonstrating the challenges of managing common pool marine ecosystem services in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ). The survey and analysis highlights how hegemonic conditions tend to preclude the establishment of cooperative agreements irrespective of the number of players involved in the fishery. Shifts in dominance away from hegemony, as demonstrated most recently in the case of the highly migratory Pacific Saury, can open the door to greater cooperation. Movement of fish stocks and displacement of fishing activities, due for example to climate change, have the capacity to cause major shifts in dominance and, in some cases, destabilize existing cooperative mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Blasiak, Robert & Yagi, Nobuyuki & Kurokura, Hisashi, 2015. "Impacts of hegemony and shifts in dominance on marine capture fisheries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 52-58.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:52:y:2015:i:c:p:52-58
    DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2014.11.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rögnvaldur Hannesson, 2011. "Game Theory and Fisheries," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 181-202, October.
    2. Pedro Pintassilgo & Marko Lindroos, 2008. "Coalition Formation In Straddling Stock Fisheries: A Partition Function Approach," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 303-317.
    3. Pedro Pintassilgo & Michael Finus & Marko Lindroos & Gordon Munro, 2010. "Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(3), pages 377-402, July.
    4. Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March.
    5. Oh Kwon, 2006. "Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 33(4), pages 463-483, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Blasiak, Robert, 2015. "Balloon effects reshaping global fisheries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 18-20.
    2. Xiao Zhang & Shengchao Ye & Manhong Shen, 2023. "Driving Factors and Spatiotemporal Characteristics of CO 2 Emissions from Marine Fisheries in China: A Commonly Neglected Carbon-Intensive Sector," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, January.

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