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Double Implementation by a Simple Game Form in the Commons Problem

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Author Info
Shin, Sungwhee
Suh, Sang-Chul
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 77 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
Pages: 205-213
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:77:y:1997:i:1:p:205-213

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Justin Leroux, 2006. "Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case," Cahiers de recherche 06-11, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Pooling Private Technologies: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2004-08, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing in Partnerships: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2005-05, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Leroux, Justin, 2005. "Strategyproof Profit Sharing: A Two-Agent Characterization," Working Papers 2005-04, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Justin Leroux, 2006. "Cooperative production under diminishing marginal returns: Interpreting fixed-path methods," Cahiers de recherche 06-10, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2006. "Triple Implementation by Sharing Mechanisms in Production Economies with Unequal Labor Skill," Discussion Paper Series a475, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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