IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeeman/v58y2009i3p315-328.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Tradable fuel economy credits: Competition and oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Rubin, Jonathan
  • Leiby, Paul N.
  • Greene, David L.

Abstract

Corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) regulations specify minimum standards for fuel efficiency that vehicle manufacturers must meet independently. We design a system of tradeable fuel economy credits that allows trading across vehicle classes and manufacturers with and without considering market power in the credit market. We perform numerical simulations to measure the potential cost savings from moving from the current CAFE system to one with stricter standards, but that allows vehicle manufacturers various levels of increased flexibility. We find that the ability for each manufacturer to average credits between its cars and trucks provides a large percentage of the potential savings. As expected, the greatest savings come from the greatest flexibility in the credit system. Market power lowers the potential cost savings to the industry as a whole, but only modestly. Loss in efficiency from market power does not eliminate the gains from credit trading.

Suggested Citation

  • Rubin, Jonathan & Leiby, Paul N. & Greene, David L., 2009. "Tradable fuel economy credits: Competition and oligopoly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 315-328, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:58:y:2009:i:3:p:315-328
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095-0696(09)00053-9
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert W. Hahn, 1984. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(4), pages 753-765.
    2. Parry, Ian & Fischer, Carolyn & Harrington, Winston, 2004. "Should Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards Be Tightened?," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-53, Resources for the Future.
    3. Greene, David L, 1991. "Short-run Pricing Strategies to Increase Corporate Average Fuel Economy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 101-114, January.
    4. Crandall, Robert W & Graham, John D, 1989. "The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile Safety," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 97-118, April.
    5. Kling, Catherine L. & Rubin, Jonathan, 1993. "Emission Saved is an Emission Earned: An Empirical Study of Emission Banking (An)," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1579, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    6. Rubin Jonathan & Kling Catherine, 1993. "An Emission Saved Is an Emission Earned: An Empirical Study of Emission Banking for Light-Duty Vehicle Manufacturers," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 257-274, November.
    7. David L. Greene, 1990. "CAFE OR PRICE?: An Analysis of the Effects of Federal Fuel Economy Regulations and Gasoline Price on New Car MPG, 1978-89," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 37-58.
    8. Malueg, David A., 1990. "Welfare consequences of emission credit trading programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 66-77, January.
    9. Misiolek, Walter S. & Elder, Harold W., 1989. "Exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 156-166, March.
    10. Austin, David & Dinan, Terry, 2005. "Clearing the air: The costs and consequences of higher CAFE standards and increased gasoline taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 562-582, November.
    11. Eftichios Sartzetakis, 1997. "Tradeable emission permits regulations in the presence of imperfectly competitive product markets: Welfare implications," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(1), pages 65-81, January.
    12. Hege Westskog, 1996. "Market Power in a System of Tradeable CO2 Quotas," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 85-103.
    13. Thorpe, Steven G, 1997. "Fuel Economy Standards, New Vehicle Sales, and Average Fuel Efficiency," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 311-326, May.
    14. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1998. "The Effects of the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency Standards in the US," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 1-33, March.
    15. Robert Godby, 2002. "Market Power in Laboratory Emission Permit Markets," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(3), pages 279-318, November.
    16. Greene, David L, 1998. "Why CAFE worked," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(8), pages 595-613, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Leard, Benjamin & McConnell, Virginia, 2015. "New Markets for Pollution and Energy Efficiency: Credit Trading under Automobile Greenhouse Gas and Fuel Economy StandardsAbstract: Recent changes to the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard," RFF Working Paper Series dp-15-16, Resources for the Future.
    2. Wang, Banban & Pizer, William A. & Munnings, Clayton, 2022. "Price limits in a tradable performance standard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    3. Thomas Klier & Joshua Linn, 2011. "Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards and the Market for New Vehicles," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 445-462, October.
    4. Mahlia, T.M.I. & Tohno, S. & Tezuka, T., 2012. "History and current status of the motor vehicle energy labeling and its implementation possibilities in Malaysia," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 1828-1844.
    5. Greene, David L. & Greenwald, Judith M. & Ciez, Rebecca E., 2020. "U.S. fuel economy and greenhouse gas standards: What have they achieved and what have we learned?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    6. Changzheng Liu and David L. Greene, 2014. "Vehicle Manufacturer Technology Adoption and Pricing Strategies under Fuel Economy/Emissions Standards and Feebates," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    7. Yeh, Sonia & Burtraw, Dallas & Sterner, Thomas & Greene, David, 2021. "Tradable performance standards in the transportation sector," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    8. Xie, Fei & Lin, Zhenhong, 2017. "Market-driven automotive industry compliance with fuel economy and greenhouse gas standards: Analysis based on consumer choice," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 299-311.
    9. Kangda Chen & Fuquan Zhao & Han Hao & Zongwei Liu & Xinglong Liu, 2021. "Hierarchical Optimization Decision-Making Method to Comply with China’s Fuel Consumption and New Energy Vehicle Credit Regulations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(14), pages 1-25, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Liu, Yimin & Helfand, Gloria E., 2009. "The Alternative Motor Fuels Act, alternative-fuel vehicles, and greenhouse gas emissions," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 755-764, October.
    2. Requate, Till, 2005. "Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Survey," Economics Working Papers 2005-12, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    3. Al-Alawi, Baha M. & Bradley, Thomas H., 2014. "Analysis of corporate average fuel economy regulation compliance scenarios inclusive of plug in hybrid vehicles," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1323-1337.
    4. Rasha Ahmed & Kathleen Segerson, 2007. "Emissions Control and the Regulation of Product Markets: The Case of Automobiles," Working papers 2007-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    5. Clerides, Sofronis & Zachariadis, Theodoros, 2008. "The effect of standards and fuel prices on automobile fuel economy: An international analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 2657-2672, September.
    6. Timilsina, Govinda R. & Dulal, Hari B., 2009. "A review of regulatory instruments to control environmental externalities from the transport sector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4867, The World Bank.
    7. Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, 2011. "The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 267-294.
    8. Beat Hintermann, 2011. "Market Power, Permit Allocation and Efficiency in Emission Permit Markets," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 49(3), pages 327-349, July.
    9. Tietenberg, Tom, 1998. "Ethical influences on the evolution of the US tradable permit approach to air pollution control," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2-3), pages 241-257, February.
    10. Changzheng Liu and David L. Greene, 2014. "Vehicle Manufacturer Technology Adoption and Pricing Strategies under Fuel Economy/Emissions Standards and Feebates," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    11. Parry, Ian W.H. & Fischer, Carolyn & Harrington, Winston, 2004. "Should Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards Be Tightened?," Discussion Papers 10605, Resources for the Future.
    12. Harrie A.A. Verbon & Cees A. Withagen, 2004. "Tradable emission permits in a federal system," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/83, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    13. Brozovic, Nicholas & Ando, Amy Whritenour, 2009. "Defensive purchasing, the safety (dis)advantage of light trucks, and motor-vehicle policy effectiveness," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 477-493, June.
    14. Hagem, Cathrine & Mæstad, Ottar, 2003. "Market power in the market for greenhouse gas emissions permits - the interplay with the fossil fuel markets," Memorandum 34/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    15. Timilsina, Govinda R. & Dulal, Hari B., 2009. "Regulatory instruments to control environmental externalities from the transport sector," European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, ISTIEE, Institute for the Study of Transport within the European Economic Integration, issue 41, pages 80-112.
    16. Andreas Löschel & Zhong Zhang, 2002. "The economic and environmental implications of the US repudiation of the kyoto protocol and the subsequent deals in Bonn and Marrakech," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 138(4), pages 711-746, December.
    17. Hatcher, Aaron, 2012. "Market power and compliance with output quotas," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 255-269.
    18. Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2004. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, January.
    19. Christoph BOhringer & Andreas LOschel, 2003. "Market power and hot air in international emissions trading: the impacts of US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(6), pages 651-663.
    20. Wang, Xu & Zhang, Xiao-Bing & Zhu, Lei, 2019. "Imperfect market, emissions trading scheme, and technology adoption: A case study of an energy-intensive sector," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 142-158.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:58:y:2009:i:3:p:315-328. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.