Motivation, money, prestige and cheats
AbstractThis paper investigates the effects of supervision and incentives on subjects’ performance and cheating behavior in a real effort task. With a sample of 540 participants in three different experiments, we investigated the interaction between motivation and monetary and social rewards, with and without supervision. Our results suggest: (1) lack of supervision promotes cheating, though workers tend to cheat moderately; (2) both economic and social incentives increase motivation but only when workers like their jobs; (3) workers do not increase their band of acceptable dishonest behavior for possible economic rewards, but they do increase dishonest behavior for possible social rewards, like prestige.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 93 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Labor supply supervision; Dishonesty behavior; Economic and social motivation; Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - General
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