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Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment

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Author Info
Daniel S. Nagin
James B. Rebitzer
Seth Sanders
Lowell J. Taylor

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Abstract

Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation: employees are "rational cheaters," who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal benefits exceed costs. We investigate the "rational cheater model" by observing how experimentally induced variation in monitoring of telephone call center employees influences opportunism. A significant fraction of employees behave as the "rational cheater model" predicts. A substantial proportion of employees, however, do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate. This heterogeneity is related to variation in employee assessments of their general treatment by the employer. (JEL D2, J2, L2, L8, M12)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1257/00028280260344498
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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 92 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 850-873
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:92:y:2002:i:4:p:850-873

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Camerer, Colin, et al, 1997. "Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 407-41, May.
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  2. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. William E. Encinosa III & Martin Gaynor & James B. Rebitzer, 1997. "The Sociology of Groups and the Economics of Incentives: Theory and Evidence on Compensation Systems," NBER Working Papers 5953, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Martin Gaynor & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2001. "Incentives In HMOs," Economics Working Paper Archive 340, Levy Economics Institute, The. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Cappelli, Peter & Chauvin, Keith, 1991. "An Interplant Test of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 769-87, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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