Ideological media bias
AbstractI develop a model of the market for news in which consumers and reporters both ideologically misinterpret information and have biased beliefs about the extent to which others misinterpret information. I show that for some parameter values, in equilibrium: (i) a monopolist media outlet hires a politically moderate reporter but duopolist outlets use relatively extreme, differentiated reporters; (ii) in duopoly, consumers think of their preferred outlet's news reporter as relatively unbiased and the other outlet's reporter as relatively biased; (iii) consumers, in the aggregate, may be less informed in duopoly than monopoly, despite more consumers receiving news in duopoly.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 78 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Media bias Media competition Ideological bias Bias blind spot Hostile media phenomenon;
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