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Experimental economics: Where next?

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  • Binmore, Ken
  • Shaked, Avner
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    Abstract

    Where should experimental economics go next? This paper uses the literature on inequity aversion as a case study in suggesting that we could profit from tightening up our act.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

    Volume (Year): 73 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 87-100

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:73:y:2010:i:1:p:87-100

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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    References

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    1. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
    2. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. Guala,Francesco, 2005. "The Methodology of Experimental Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521618618, 9.
    4. Tirole, Jean, 2002. "Rational irrationality: Some economics of self-management," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 633-655, May.
    5. Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "Fairness and Contract Design," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 67, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    6. Konow, James, 1996. "A positive theory of economic fairness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 13-35, October.
    7. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    8. Binmore,K. & McCarthy,J. & Ponti,G. & ..., 1999. "A backward induction experiment," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 34, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    9. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model," IEW - Working Papers 191, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    10. Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt3d04q5sm, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    11. Ken Binmore, 2007. "Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262026074, December.
    12. Huck, Steffen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 1999. "Stackelberg beats Cournot: On collusion and efficiency in experimental markets," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,32, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    13. Engelmann,Dirk & Strobel,Martin, 2002. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT) 015, Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    14. Angus Deaton, 2002. "Health, inequality, and economic development," Working Papers 270, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Center for Health and Wellbeing..
    15. Hey, John D & Orme, Chris, 1994. "Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1291-1326, November.
    16. Binmore, Ken, 2005. "Natural Justice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780195178111, October.
    17. Bolton, Gary E, 1991. "A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1096-136, December.
    18. Manski, Charles F., 2002. "Identification of decision rules in experiments on simple games of proposal and response," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 880-891, May.
    19. Mitzkewitz, Michael & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1993. "Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 171-98.
    20. Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1985. "Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 708-20, September.
    21. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
    22. Jakub Steiner, 2007. "A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(1), pages 1-4.
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    24. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    25. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
    26. Harless, David W & Camerer, Colin F, 1994. "The Predictive Utility of Generalized Expected Utility Theories," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1251-89, November.
    27. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2007:i:1:p:1-4 is not listed on IDEAS
    28. Avner Shaked, 2005. "The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000612, www.najecon.org.
    29. Ulrich Schmidt & Tibor Neugebauer, 2007. "Testing expected utility in the presence of errors," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 470-485, 03.
    30. Amos Tversky, 2003. "Preference, Belief, and Similarity: Selected Writings," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026270093x edited by Eldar Shafir, December.
    31. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    32. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December.
    33. Avner Shaked, 2005. "The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000570, UCLA Department of Economics.
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