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Honesty nudges: Effect varies with content but not with timing

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  • Le Maux, Benoît
  • Necker, Sarah

Abstract

We use a ten-round online mind game to determine whether the effect of honesty nudges depends on timing and content. Reminding individuals about the right thing to do increases honesty. Including information that it is possible to assess an individual’s dishonesty strengthens the effect of the intervention. Both types of intervention are similarly effective when they take place before an individual has made any decision or after individuals have played five rounds of the mind game. Nudging an individual after they have made five decisions allows us to add personalized information based on the individual’s previous response; however, this does not increase honesty. Examining the reaction to nudges based on previous behavior shows that (presumably) honest and dishonest individuals respond by reducing overreporting. The effect of the different nudge content is driven by those previously dishonest.

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  • Le Maux, Benoît & Necker, Sarah, 2023. "Honesty nudges: Effect varies with content but not with timing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 433-456.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:207:y:2023:i:c:p:433-456
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.01.011
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dishonesty; lying; cheating; honesty nudge; moral reminder; deterrence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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