Social dynamics and minority protection
AbstractMinority-protection laws often differ over time and across societies. We show how the dynamic interaction between strong and weak social groups may account for these differences and their evolution. We assume that interaction occurs in a democratic environment, where representative institutions design norms according to the perceived voters' support. Minority protection is strong when social reaction to discrimination is high. Interestingly, when discriminators harm members of weak social groups more if they do not react against discrimination, an initial increase in minority protection immediately reduces the level of social unrest, giving rise to fluctuations, as protest starts again when discrimination is back to high levels.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 30 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle
Evolutionary games Social dynamics Civil rights Hate crimes Minority protection;
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