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Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution

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Author Info
Garoupa, Nuno

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Abstract

Mandatory prosecution is inefficient according to legal economists. We argue that when prosecutors are fairly insulated from their performance or are highly risk-averse mandatory prosecution is better than selective prosecution. This result has important implications for comparative law. We use our findings to provide a positive explanation for the stylized fact that mandatory prosecution generally prevails in civil law jurisdictions whereas selective prosecution is typical of common law jurisdictions.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V7M-4T4HP52-4/2/9a6f8c51e81d5ea9fbcd6736fbba3555
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 25-28
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:29:y:2009:i:1:p:25-28

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle

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Related research
Keywords: Prosecutors Mandatory prosecution Selective prosecution Civil law Common law;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Landes, William M, 1971. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 61-107, April.
  2. Boari, Nicola & Fiorentini, Gianluca, 2001. "An economic analysis of plea bargaining: the incentives of the parties in a mixed penal system," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 213-231, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Froeb, Luke M. & Kobayashi, Bruce H., 2001. "Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 267-272, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Palumbo, Giuliana, 2006. "Optimal duplication of effort in advocacy systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 112-128, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Anne van Aaken & Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt, 2003. "The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch. A Conceptual Framework," ICER Working Papers 32-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Bjerk, David, 2005. "Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 591-625, October.
    Other versions:
  7. Parisi, Francesco, 2002. "Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 193-216, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

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