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Optimal Duplication of Effort in Advocacy Systems

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  • Giuliana Palumbo

    ()
    (Bank of Italy, Law and Economics Research Dept.)

Abstract

The paper focuses on the creation of information for decision-making when agents' effort is non observable and rewards are indirect, that is, only based on the final decision. Following Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), the paper shows that the creation of advocates of special interests, as opposed to non-partisans, generates an efficient mechanism of mutual monitoring that reduces the scope for manipulation. Such monitoring is preferable over imposing penalties for detected manipulation; it is also preferable to creating an agency that monitors the non partisan agent. Applications to transfer price policies and comparative judicial systems are considered.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area in its series Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) with number 502.

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Date of creation: Jun 2004
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Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_502_04

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Keywords: advocacy; information creation; manipulation; monitoring;

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References

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  1. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 201-28, Fall.
  2. Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1985. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 749, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Paolo Finaldi Russo & Luigi Leva, 2004. "Il debito commerciale in Italia: quanto contano le motivazioni finanziarie?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 496, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Politics of Government Decision Making: Regulatory Institutions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1-31, Spring.
  5. Shin, Hyun Song, 1997. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," CEPR Discussion Papers 1722, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Maria Rosaria Marino & Chiara Rapallini, 2003. "La composizione familiare e lÂ’imposta sul reddito delle persone fisiche: unÂ’analisi degli effetti redistributivi e alcune considerazioni sul benessere sociale," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 477, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  7. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Giuliana Palumbo, 2000. "Decision Rules and Optimal Delegation of Information Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 42, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  2. Elisabetta Iossa & Giuliana Palumbo, 2002. "Decision Rules and Information Provision:Monitoring versus Manipulation," Economics and Finance Discussion Papers 02-17, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
  3. Garoupa, Nuno, 2009. "Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-28, March.

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