The effect of salaries on turnover and performance is analyzed for U.S. attorneys in office during the years 1969 through 1999. Lower salaries are shown to increase the turnover of U.S. attorneys, and higher turnover is shown to reduce output. Two features distinguish U.S. attorneys (chief federal prosecutors) from other public- and private-sector employees. First, since 1977, U.S. attorney salaries have been tied to the salaries of members of Congress and are thus exogenously determined. Second, there are public measures for the output of U.S. attorneys. Both features simplify the study of the effect of salaries on turnover and performance.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Contact details of provider: Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637 Fax: (773) 753-0811 Email: Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)