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Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared

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Parisi, Francesco
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 22 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 193-216
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:22:y:2002:i:2:p:193-216

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  1. Nuno Garoupa, 2008. "Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory v selective prosecution," Working Papers 2008-04, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," CEPR Discussion Papers 6150, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Zhou, J., 2007. "In Litigation: How Far do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead?," Discussion Paper 2007-002, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony," CEPR Discussion Papers 5124, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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