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Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate Sentencing: The Truth about Truth-in-Sentencing Laws

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  • Shepherd, Joanna M

Abstract

This study explores the impact of truth-in-sentencing (TIS) legislation on police, prosecutors, and criminals. Truth-in-sentencing laws are determinate-sentencing laws that require violent offenders to serve at least 85 percent of their prison sentences. The standard economic model of crime suggests that TIS laws will deter violent offenders but also reduce probabilities of arrest and conviction. However, I explain that if states share the goals of TIS legislation, police and prosecutors may increase these probabilities. My theoretical model also predicts that the legislation will cause more trials and impose higher maximum prison sentences. Using a county-level data set, empirical results confirm that TIS laws deter violent offenders, increase the probability of arrest, and increase maximum imposed prison sentences. Truth-in-sentencing laws decrease murders by 16 percent, aggravated assaults by 12 percent, robberies by 24 percent, rapes by 12 percent, and larcenies by 3 percent. However, offenders substitute into property crimes: burglaries increase by 20 percent and auto thefts by 15 percent. Copyright 2002 by the University of Chicago.

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  • Shepherd, Joanna M, 2002. "Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate Sentencing: The Truth about Truth-in-Sentencing Laws," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 509-534, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:45:y:2002:i:2:p:509-34
    DOI: 10.1086/340644
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    1. Garoupa, Nuno, 2009. "Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-28, March.
    2. Donohue III, John J. & Wolfers, Justin, 2006. "Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate," IZA Discussion Papers 1949, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Qi Li & Wei Long, 2018. "Do parole abolition and Truth-in-Sentencing deter violent crimes in Virginia?," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 55(4), pages 2027-2045, December.
    4. Bekkerman, Anton & Gilpin, Gregory A., 2014. "Can equitable punishment be mandated? Estimating impacts of sentencing guidelines on disciplinary disparities," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 51-61.
    5. Amanda Ross & Anne Walker, 2014. "Low Priority Laws and the Allocation of Police Resources," Working Papers 14-06, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    6. Fusako Tsuchimoto & Libor Dusek, 2009. "Responses to More Severe Punishment in the Courtroom: Evidence from Truth-in-Sentencing Laws," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp403, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    7. Alex Raskolnikov, 2020. "Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Missing Literature," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-59.
    8. Manu Raghav, 2006. "Why do budgets received by state prosecutors vary across districts in the United States?," CAEPR Working Papers 2006-018, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    9. Emily G. Owens, 2011. "Truthiness in Punishment: The Far Reach of Truth‐in‐Sentencing Laws in State Courts," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(s1), pages 239-261, December.
    10. Jaewook Byeon & Iljoong Kim & Dongwon Lee, 2018. "Protest and property crime: political use of police resources and the deterrence of crime," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 181-196, April.
    11. Gabriel Costeira Machado & Cristiano Aguiar De Oliveira, 2018. "The Deterrent Effects Of Brazillian Child Labor Law," Anais do XLIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 44th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 237, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    12. Amanda Ross & Anne Walker, 2017. "The Impact Of Low-Priority Laws On Criminal Activity: Evidence From California," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 239-252, April.
    13. Ross, Amanda, 2012. "Crime, police, and truth-in-sentencing: The impact of state sentencing policy on local communities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 144-152.
    14. Wei Long, 2016. "Does Longer Incarceration Deter or Incapacitate Crimes? New Evidence from Truth-in-Sentencing Reform," Working Papers 1607, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
    15. Iljoong Kim & Jaewook Byeon, 2017. "Discretionary prosecution of regulatory crimes: disproportionate emphasis and consequences to other serious crimes," Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 559-587, October.

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