Compulsory licensing of technology and the essential facilities doctrine
AbstractWe consider compulsory licensing of intellectual property as a remedy for anticompetitive practices. We identify aspects of intellectual property that could warrant a different remedy from those developed for access to physical essential facilities. Based on the analysis, we present a characterisation of optimal compulsory licensing for a simple market. We find that royalty payments offer a greater range of choices to a regulator than fixed fees. Thus, even though the marginal cost of supplying access to intellectual property is zero, some unit charging is likely to be efficient.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Information Economics and Policy.
Volume (Year): 16 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505549
Other versions of this item:
- Aoki, Reiko & Small, John, 2003. "Compulsory Licensing of Technology and the Essential Facilities Doctrine," Discussion Paper 167, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
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