Patent licensing with spillovers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 73 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kamien, Morton I & Tauman, Yair, 1986. "Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 471-91, August.
- Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 567-89, August.
- Kamien, Morton I. & Oren, Shmuel S. & Tauman, Yair, 1992. "Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 483-508.
- Janusz A. Ordover, 1991. "A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 43-60, Winter.
- Kamien, Morton I., 1992. "Patent licensing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354 Elsevier.
- Muto, Shigeo, 1987. "Possibility of relicensing and patent protection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 927-945, June.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007.
"Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 208-214, December.
- Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2008.
"License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 91-106, May.
- Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2007. "License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 199, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Aoki, Reiko & Small, John, 2004.
"Compulsory licensing of technology and the essential facilities doctrine,"
Information Economics and Policy,
Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 13-29, March.
- Aoki, Reiko & Small, John, 2003. "Compulsory Licensing of Technology and the Essential Facilities Doctrine," Discussion Paper 167, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Elisabetta Ottoz, 2005. "Technological spillover and the time distribution of licenses," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(15), pages 1-10.
- Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2006. "License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for Losers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 96, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2005:i:15:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
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