Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service in Post
AbstractA postal regulator typically faces two issues which make the design of efficient access pricing especially difficult and which complicate the process of liberalizing the industry. First, universal service obligations, together with the presence of fixed costs, require retail prices to depart from the underlying marginal costs of the incumbent provider. Second, competing firms may be able to bypass the incumbent's delivery network. Within a simple and stylized framework, this note analyzes how access charges should best be set in the light of these twin constraints.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Network Economics.
Volume (Year): 7 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
Other versions of this item:
- Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post," MPRA Paper 62, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- L87 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Postal and Delivery Services
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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