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Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service in Post

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  • Armstrong Mark

    ()
    (University College London)

Abstract

A postal regulator typically faces two issues which make the design of efficient access pricing especially difficult and which complicate the process of liberalizing the industry. First, universal service obligations, together with the presence of fixed costs, require retail prices to depart from the underlying marginal costs of the incumbent provider. Second, competing firms may be able to bypass the incumbent's delivery network. Within a simple and stylized framework, this note analyzes how access charges should best be set in the light of these twin constraints.

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File URL: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rne.2008.7.2/rne.2008.7.2.1144/rne.2008.7.2.1144.xml?format=INT
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Network Economics.

Volume (Year): 7 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 1-16

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:7:y:2008:i:2:n:1

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  1. Peter A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1968. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production," Working papers 22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. De Donder, Philippe, 2006. "Access Pricing in the Postal Sector," IDEI Working Papers 319, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, January.
  4. Mark Armstrong, 2001. "Access Pricing, Bypass, and Universal Service," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 297-301, May.
  5. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-50, June.
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Cited by:
  1. De Donder Phillippe & Cremer Helmuth & Dudley Paul & Rodriguez Frank, 2008. "Price Controls in the Postal Sector: A Welfare Analysis of Alternative Control Structures," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1-25, June.
  2. Jaag Christian, 2013. "Price Regulation and the Financing of Universal Services in Network Industries," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 125-150, September.
  3. De Donder Philippe & Cremer Helmuth & Dudley Paul & Rodriguez Frank, 2011. "Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 1-24, September.

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