Counterfactuals in wonderland
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- Dov Samet, 1997. "Counterfactuals in Wonderland," Game Theory and Information 9703002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
- Samet, Dov, 1996.
"Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 230-251, December.
- Dov Samet, 1994. "Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Game Theory and Information 9408001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Aug 1994.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
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Cited by:
- Graciela Kuechle, 2009. "What Happened To The Three‐Legged Centipede Game?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 562-585, July.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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