The predictive role of counterfactuals
AbstractWe suggest a model that describes how counterfactuals are constructed and justified. The model can describe how counterfactual beliefs are updated given the unfolding of actual history. It also allows us to examine the use of counterfactuals in prediction, and to show that a logically omniscient reasoner gains nothing from using counterfactuals for prediction.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00712888.
Date of creation: Jul 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Theory and Decision, 2012, 73, 1, NC
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induction; counterfactuals; prediction;
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-FOR-2012-07-14 (Forecasting)
- NEP-HIS-2012-07-14 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
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