Sequential commitment games
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.009
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111670, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Joseph Y. Halpern & Yuval Heller & Eyal Winter, 2022. "The Benefits of Coarse Preferences," Papers 2201.10141, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
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More about this item
Keywords
Commitment games; Extensive-form games; Pareto efficiency;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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