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Regulatory restrictions and energy: The impact of the Jones Act on spot gasoline prices

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  • Gius, Mark

Abstract

The purpose of the present study is to estimate the effects of the Jones Act on spot gasoline prices. Although the Jones Act pertains to the domestic shipment of all types of goods, the present study will only focus on gasoline. The present study will use data obtained from the Energy Information Administration in order to determine if the price of gasoline declined during Jones Act waiver periods. Looking at daily prices, the results regarding the effects of the Jones Act on spot gasoline prices are mixed. When using a t-test, the results indicated either that there was no significant difference or that prices were actually higher during the waiver periods. When using a first-order autoregressive model, it was found that prices were lower during the 2005 waiver period but higher during the 2012 waiver. Given these inconclusive results, it is not possible to conclude that the Jones Act restrictions contribute to higher gasoline prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Gius, Mark, 2013. "Regulatory restrictions and energy: The impact of the Jones Act on spot gasoline prices," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 1058-1063.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:62:y:2013:i:c:p:1058-1063
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.07.086
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul R. Zimmerman, 2012. "The Competitive Impact of Hypermarket Retailers on Gasoline Prices," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(1), pages 27-41.
    2. Vita, Michael G, 2000. "Regulatory Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Control: The Competitive Impact of Gasoline Divorcement Policies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 217-233, November.
    3. Zimmerman, Paul R., 2009. "The competitive impact of hypermarket retailers on gasoline prices," MPRA Paper 20248, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Skidmore, Mark & Peltier, James & Alm, James, 2005. "Do state motor fuel sales-below-cost laws lower prices?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 189-211, January.
    5. Rod Anderson & Ronald Johnson, 1999. "Antitrust and Sales-Below-Cost Laws: The Case of Retail Gasoline," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 14(3), pages 189-204, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Olney, William W., 2020. "Cabotage sabotage? The curious case of the Jones Act," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    2. Guangyong Zhang & Lixin Tian & Wenbin Zhang & Xu Yan & Bingyue Wan & Zaili Zhen, 2020. "A Study on the Similarities and Differences of the Conventional Gasoline Spot Price Fluctuation Network between Different Harbors," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-25, January.

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    Keywords

    Gasoline; Jones Act; Shipping;
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