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The global markets for coking coal and iron ore — Complementary goods, integrated mining companies and strategic behavior

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  • Hecking, Harald
  • Panke, Timo

Abstract

The global market for coking coal is linked to the global market for iron ore since both goods are complementary inputs in pig iron production. Moreover, international trade of both commodities is highly concentrated, with only a few large companies active on both input markets. Given this setting, the paper presented investigates the strategy of quantity-setting (Cournot) mining companies that own both a coking coal and an iron ore division. Do these firms optimize the divisions' output on a firm level or by each division separately (division-by-division)? First, using a theoretical model of two Cournot duopolies of complementary goods, we find that there exists a critical capacity constraint below/above at which firm-level optimization results in identical/superior profits compared with division-level optimization. Second, by applying a spatial multi-input equilibrium simulation model of the coking coal and iron ore markets, we find that due to the limited capacity firms gain no (substantial) additional benefit from optimizing output on a firm level.

Suggested Citation

  • Hecking, Harald & Panke, Timo, 2015. "The global markets for coking coal and iron ore — Complementary goods, integrated mining companies and strategic behavior," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(PA), pages 26-38.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:52:y:2015:i:pa:p:26-38
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2015.09.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lorenczik, Stefan & Malischek, Raimund & Trüby, Johannes, 2017. "Modeling strategic investment decisions in spatial markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(2), pages 605-618.
    2. Bloomfield, Matthew J., 2021. "Compensation disclosures and strategic commitment: Evidence from revenue-based pay," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(2), pages 620-643.
    3. Guo, Sui & Li, Huajiao & An, Haizhong & Sun, Qingru & Hao, Xiaoqing & Liu, Yanxin, 2019. "Steel product prices transmission activities in the midstream industrial chain and global markets," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 56-71.
    4. Berk, Istemi & Çam, Eren, 2020. "The shift in global crude oil market structure: A model-based analysis of the period 2013–2017," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    5. Berk, Istemi & Çam , Eren, 2019. "The Shift in Global Crude Oil Market Structure: A model-based analysis of the period 2013–2017," EWI Working Papers 2019-5, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cournot oligopolies; Parallel vertical integration; Complementary inputs; Applied industrial organization; Mixed complementarity problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices

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