The Meaning of "Upstream" and "Downstream" and the Implications for Modeling Vertical Mergers
AbstractThis paper discusses alternative definitions of the terms "upstream" and "downstream," and shows how each can be represented within a single model of complementary oligopoly. The different definitions have strikingly different implications for the effect of vertical mergers. While the correct definition is not obvious, the model implies an observable condition that determines the competitive effect of a vertical merger. This condition can be a guide to empirical studies of vertical mergers and integration. Copyright 1989 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.
Volume (Year): 37 (1989)
Issue (Month): 4 (June)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821
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