Market Power with Interdependent Demand: Sale of Emission Permits and Natural Gas from Russia
AbstractWith implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia will most likely be able to exert market power in the emission permit market. But, as Russia is also a big exporter of fossil fuels, the incentives to boost the permit price may be weak. However, a significant share of Russia’s fossil fuel exports is natural gas. If a high permit price boosts the demand for natural gas through substitution from more polluting fuels and thus increase gas profits, this may increase the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, a large fossil fuel exporter may use its market position to influence the effective demand for permits. Hence, the relationship between permit income and fossil fuels exports runs in both directions. In this article, we explore the interdependence between the revenues from permit and fossil fuel exports both theoretically and numerically. A computable general equilibrium model suggests the fact that Russia as a big gas exporter has small effect on the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, Russia’s monopoly power in the permit market has a small, but non-negligible impact on the optimal level of Russian gas exports. Copyright Springer 2006
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental & Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
climate policy; emission permits; market power; natural gas; Q4; D58; L12; Q28; Q48;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Steffen Kallbekken & Hege Westskog, 2005. "Should Developing Countries Take on Binding Commitments in a Climate Agreement? An Assessment of Gains and Uncertainty," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 41-60.
- Dudek, Daniel J. & Golub, Alexander A. & Strukova, Elena B., 2006. "Should Russia increase domestic prices for natural gas?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(13), pages 1659-1670, September.
- Böhringer, Christoph & Moslener, Ulf & Sturm, Bodo, 2006.
"Hot Air for Sale: A Quantitative Assessment of Russia's Near-Term Climate Policy Options,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
06-16, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Christoph Böhringer & Ulf Moslener & Bodo Sturm, 2007. "Hot air for sale: a quantitative assessment of Russia’s near-term climate policy options," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(4), pages 545-572, December.
- Cathrine Hagem, 2008. "Incentives for merger in a noncompetitive permit market," Discussion Papers 568, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
- Jaehn, Florian & Letmathe, Peter, 2010. "The emissions trading paradox," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(1), pages 248-254, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.