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CEO career concerns and investment efficiency: Evidence from China

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  • Xie, Jun

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of CEO career concerns on a firm's investment efficiency for publicly listed Chinese companies from 2002 to 2009. We use CEO age and appointment of new CEO as proxies for CEO career concerns. For the whole sample, we demonstrate that younger CEOs and newly appointed CEOs are prone to invest less and more efficiently. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, depending on their ultimate ownership. The age effect seems stronger in state-owned enterprises and the new appointment effect seems stronger in non-state-owned enterprises. Our results indicate that CEOs have long-term career concerns that can improve a firm's investment efficiency even in a transitional economy such as China.

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  • Xie, Jun, 2015. "CEO career concerns and investment efficiency: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 149-159.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ememar:v:24:y:2015:i:c:p:149-159
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2015.06.001
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Career concerns; CEO age; New CEO appointment; Investment efficiency; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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