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Incentives for CEOs with multitasks: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises

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  • Bai, Chong-En
  • Xu, Lixin Colin

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics.

Volume (Year): 33 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 517-539

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:33:y:2005:i:3:p:517-539

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864

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References

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  1. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133 Elsevier.
  2. Benito Arruñada & Luis Garicano & Luis Vázquez, 1999. "Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 424, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  3. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
  4. Rajesh Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1998. "The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," NBER Working Papers 6634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
  6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  7. Lafontaine, Francine & Slade, Margaret E, 1997. "Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 1-25, March.
  8. Erin Anderson & David C. Schmittlein, 1984. "Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 385-395, Autumn.
  9. Arora, Ashish & Gambardella, Alfonso, 1990. "Complementarity and External Linkages: The Strategies of the Large Firms in Biotechnology," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(4), pages 361-79, June.
  10. Cull, Robert & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2003. "Who gets credit? The behavior of bureaucrats and state banks in allocating credit to Chinese state-owned enterprises," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 533-559, August.
  11. Brickley, James A, 1999. "Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 745-74, October.
  12. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
  13. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 511-28, June.
  14. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
  15. Shirley, Mary M & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2001. "Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 168-200, April.
  16. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
  17. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
  18. Lixin Colin Xu, 2000. "Control, Incentives and Competition: The Impact of Reform on Chinese State-owned Enterprises," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(1), pages 151-173, March.
  19. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn.
  20. Ichniowski, Casey & Shaw, Kathryn & Prennushi, Giovanna, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 291-313, June.
  21. Andrea Shepard, 1993. "Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 58-77, Spring.
  22. Slade, Margaret E, 1996. "Multitask Agency and Contract Choice: An Empirical Exploration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(2), pages 465-86, May.
  23. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November.
  24. Cull, Robert & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2000. "Bureaucrats, State Banks, and the Efficiency of Credit Allocation: The Experience of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-31, March.
  25. Groves, Theodore & Yongmiao Hong & John McMillan & Barry Naughton, 1995. "China's Evolving Managerial Labor Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 873-92, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 796-817, December.
  2. Yu, J. & Nijkamp, P., 2008. "China’s prospects as an innovative country: an industrial economics perspective," Serie Research Memoranda, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics 0009, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
  3. Pattarin Adithipyangkul & Ilan Alon & Tianyu Zhang, 2011. "Executive perks: Compensation and corporate performance in China," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 401-425, June.
  4. Charles Calomiris & Raymond Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, 2008. "Profiting from Government Stakes in a Command Economy: Evidence from Chinese Asset Sales," NBER Working Papers 13774, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Sunny Sun & Xia Zhao & Haibin Yang, 2010. "Executive compensation in Asia: A critical review and outlook," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 775-802, December.
  6. Johansson, Anders C. & Feng, Xunan, 2013. "CEO Incentives in Chinese State-Controlled Firms," Working Paper Series, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics 2013-27, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics.
  7. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from New Micro Data," IZA Discussion Papers 1914, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Hu, Fang & Tan, Weiqiang & Xin, Qingquan & Yang, Sixian, 2013. "How do market forces affect executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 78-87.
  9. Deng, Yongheng & Morck, Randall & Wu, Jing & Yeung, Bernard, 2011. "Monetary and Fiscal Stimuli, Ownership Structure, and China's Housing Market," Ratio Working Papers, The Ratio Institute 173, The Ratio Institute.
  10. Lin, Chen & Lin, Ping & Song, Frank M. & Li, Chuntao, 2011. "Managerial incentives, CEO characteristics and corporate innovation in China's private sector," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 176-190, June.
  11. Hu, Fang & Leung, Sidney C.M., 2012. "Top management turnover, firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 235-262.
  12. Johansson, Anders C. & Feng, Xunan, 2013. "The State Advances, the Private Sector Retreats: Firm Effects of China’s Great Stimulus Program," Working Paper Series, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics 2013-25, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics.
  13. Sandeep Mohapatra & Rachael Goodhue & Scott Rozelle, 2008. "Incentive Complementarity in China’s Rural Enterprises," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 63-79, August.
  14. Wenjing Li & Ran Zhang, 2010. "Corporate Social Responsibility, Ownership Structure, and Political Interference: Evidence from China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, Springer, vol. 96(4), pages 631-645, November.

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