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Optimal dynamic law enforcement

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  • Feichtinger, Gustav
  • Grienauer, Waltraud
  • Tragler, Gernot

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  • Feichtinger, Gustav & Grienauer, Waltraud & Tragler, Gernot, 2002. "Optimal dynamic law enforcement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 58-69, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:141:y:2002:i:1:p:58-69
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Dawid, H. & Feichtinger, G. & Novak, A., 2002. "Extortion as an obstacle to economic growth: a dynamic game analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 499-516, September.
    3. Skiba, A K, 1978. "Optimal Growth with a Convex-Concave Production Function," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 527-539, May.
    4. Angelo Antoci & Pier Sacco, 1995. "A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 89-122, June.
    5. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    6. Smith, Vernon L, 1969. "On Models of Commercial Fishing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(2), pages 181-198, March/Apr.
    7. Jonathan P. Caulkins, 1993. "Local Drug Markets' Response to Focused Police Enforcement," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(5), pages 848-863, October.
    8. Kort, P.M. & Feichtinger, G. & Hartl, R.F. & Haunschmied, J.L., 1998. "Optimal enforcement policies (crackdowns) on an illicit drug market," Other publications TiSEM c6de10bc-16b6-4f0c-830d-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Baveja, Alok & Batta, Rajan & Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Karwan, Mark H., 1993. "Modeling the response of illicit drug markets to local enforcement," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 73-89, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zeiler, I. & Caulkins, J.P. & Tragler, G., 2011. "Optimal control of interacting systems with DNSS property: The case of illicit drug use," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 60-73, April.
    2. Zeiler, I. & Caulkins, J.P. & Tragler, G., 2011. "Optimal control of interacting systems with DNSS property: The case of illicit drug use," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 60-73.
    3. I. Zeiler & J.P. Caulkins & G. Tragler, 2011. "Optimal Control of Interacting Systems with DNSS Property: The Case of Illicit Drug Use," Post-Print hal-00978258, HAL.
    4. Roy Cerqueti & Raffaella Coppier, 2016. "A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 243(1), pages 71-87, August.
    5. Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Feichtinger, Gustav & Grass, Dieter & Hartl, Richard F. & Kort, Peter M. & Novak, Andreas J. & Seidl, Andrea, 2013. "Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: An alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 225(3), pages 541-546.
    6. Jana Zausinová & Martin Zoričak & Marcel Vološin & Vladimír Gazda, 2020. "Aspects of complexity in citizen–bureaucrat corruption: an agent-based simulation model," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 15(2), pages 527-552, April.
    7. R.F. Hartl & P.M. Kort & G. Feichtinger, 2003. "Offense Control Taking into Account Heterogeneity of Age," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 116(3), pages 591-620, March.
    8. V. Borisov & G. Feichtinger & A. Kryazhimskii, 2000. "Optimal Enforcement on a Pure Seller's Market of Illicit Drugs," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 106(1), pages 1-22, July.
    9. Herbert Dawid & Engelbert Dockner & Richard Hartl & Josef Haunschmied & Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger & Mikulas Luptacik & Alexander Mehlmann & Alexia Prskawetz & Marion Rauner & Gerhard Sorger & Gernot T, 2010. "Gustav Feichtinger celebrates his 70th birthday," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 18(4), pages 437-451, December.
    10. Ken-Ichi Akao & Takashi Kamihigashi & Kazuo Nishimura, 2015. "Critical Capital Stock in a Continuous-Time Growth Model with a Convex-Concave Production Function," Discussion Paper Series DP2015-39, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    11. Kaya, C. Yalcin, 2004. "Time-optimal switching control for the US cocaine epidemic," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 57-72, March.

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