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An experimental test of a committee search model

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  • Hizen, Yoichi
  • Kawata, Keisuke
  • Sasaki, Masaru

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to design a laboratory experiment for an infinite-horizon sequential committee search model in order to test some of the implications obtained by the model in Albrecht et al. (2010) (AAV). We find that, compared with single-agent search, the search duration is longer for committee search under the unanimity rule, but is shorter for committee search in which at least one vote is required to stop searching. In addition, according to estimates from round-based search decisions, subjects are more likely to vote to stop searching in committee search than in single-agent search. This confirms that agents are less picky in committee search. Overall, the experimental outcomes are consistent with the implications suggested by the AAV model. However, despite the prediction from the AAV model, we could not obtain a significant outcome in relation to the size order of the probabilities of voting to stop searching in committee search for the various plurality voting rules.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 61 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 59-76

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:61:y:2013:i:c:p:59-76

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

Related research

Keywords: Experiments; Committee search; Plurality voting rules;

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References

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  1. Albrecht, James & Anderson, Axel Z. & Vroman, Susan, 2007. "Search by Committee," IZA Discussion Papers 3137, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Cramer, J. S. & Hartog, J. & Jonker, N. & Van Praag, C. M., 2002. "Low risk aversion encourages the choice for entrepreneurship: an empirical test of a truism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 29-36, May.
  3. Boone, J. & Sadrieh, A. & Ours, J.C. van, 2004. "Experiments on Unemployment Benefit Sanctions and Job Search Behavior," Discussion Paper 2004-8, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Schunk, Daniel & Winter, Joachim, 2007. "The Relationship Between Risk Attitudes and Heuristics in Search Tasks: A Laboratory Experiment," Discussion Papers in Economics 1377, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  5. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  6. Schunk, Daniel, 2009. "Behavioral heterogeneity in dynamic search situations: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(9), pages 1719-1738, September.
  7. Cox, James C & Oaxaca, Ronald L, 1989. " Laboratory Experiments with a Finite-Horizon Job-Search Model," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 301-29, September.
  8. Harrison, Glenn W & Morgan, Peter, 1990. "Search Intensity in Experiments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 478-86, June.
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