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Political activism as a determinant of strategic transfers: Evidence from an indian public works program

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  • Chau, Nancy H.
  • Liu, Yanyan
  • Soundararajan, Vidhya

Abstract

Are political activists preferentially targeted by politicians who engage in strategic transfers to bolster political support? This paper incorporates two distinctive rationales in a model of politically motivated strategic transfers: to mobilize support from the activists themselves, and to mobilize support from electors these activists have influence over. Using novel household data on ex ante political affiliation and jobs received subsequent to a large-scale decentralized workfare program in India, we find that activists are indeed preferentially targeted. Compared to inactive households, active households obtained 29% more days of work and 84% more payment from this program. We provide evidence supporting the use of transfers to leverage the influence of activists over the decision-making of other electors. Further, we find that non-affiliates received 21% more days and 56% more payment than loyalists, pointing to an expansionist strategy.

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  • Chau, Nancy H. & Liu, Yanyan & Soundararajan, Vidhya, 2021. "Political activism as a determinant of strategic transfers: Evidence from an indian public works program," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:132:y:2021:i:c:s0014292120302610
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103631
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political activism; Strategic transfers; Political clientelism; NREGS; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies

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