Inequality and Political Clientelism: Evidence from South India
AbstractPolitical parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 10-26.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2010
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decentralization; patronage; clientelism; inequality; poverty; India;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2010-10-23 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2010-10-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Vandeplas, Anneleen & Minten, Bart & Swinnen, Johan F.M., 2012.
"Multinationals versus cooperatives: The income and efficiency effects of supply chain governance in India,"
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- Vandeplas, Anneleen, 2011. "Multinationals or Cooperatives: Does it Matter to Farmers? - A Study of the Dairy Sector in Punjab (India)," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 115545, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Mueller, Ulrike, 2012. "Pro-poor Service Delivery and Social Identity: An Experimental Investigation," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
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