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Local institutional structure and clientelistic access to employment: the case of MGNREGS in three states of India

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  • Nandi, Alita
  • Bhattacharya, Anindya
  • Kar, Anirban

Abstract

This work is a contribution, first, toward measuring rural institu- tions taking multidimensional networks of socio-economic interactions in villages as the primitive and then toward exploring impacts of such institutions on household-access to a public employment programme: MGNREGS in India. Our focus is on the institution of clientelism- patronage-the presence and intensity of that. Using primary data we identify the presence of patron-client relationships, show that clients have better access to MGNREGS employment than non-clients and a household in elite-villages has higher access to MGNREGS employment. Complementary to our empirical exercises, we construct and analyze a theoretical model supporting our empirical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Nandi, Alita & Bhattacharya, Anindya & Kar, Anirban, 2017. "Local institutional structure and clientelistic access to employment: the case of MGNREGS in three states of India," ISER Working Paper Series 2017-14, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:ese:iserwp:2017-14
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    Cited by:

    1. Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Sunil Kumar & Alita Nandi, 2018. "Patronage and power in rural India: a study based on interaction networks," Discussion Papers 18/19, Department of Economics, University of York.
    2. Srivastava, Aryan & Kalra, Aarushi & Tiwari, Saket, 2022. "A Dataset of Geolocated Villages and Gram Panchayat Election Candidates in Uttar Pradesh," SocArXiv d6w2h, Center for Open Science.
    3. Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Alita Nandi, 2023. "Asymmetric networks, clientelism and their impacts: households' access to workfare employment in rural India," Papers 2304.04236, arXiv.org.

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    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • P47 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Performance and Prospects

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