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Loss avoidance as selection principle: Evidence from simple stag-hunt games Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Rydval, Ondrej Ortmann, Andreas Additional information is available for the following
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters .
Volume (Year): 88 (2005)Issue (Month): 1 (July)Pages: 101-107Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML ,
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:88:y:2005:i:1:p:101-107Contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
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