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Market foreclosure without vertical integration

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  • Hardt, Michael
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-41CXW90-11/2/afdfbab8805f075f6336705a840ee0d8
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

    Volume (Year): 47 (1995)
    Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
    Pages: 423-429

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:47:y:1995:i:3-4:p:423-429

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    2. Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April.
    3. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    4. David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
    5. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
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    Cited by:
    1. Roman Inderst & Christian Wey, 2005. "How Strong Buyers Spur Upstream Innovation," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 524, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Pedro Mendi, 2005. "Vertical Integration, Collusion Downstream, and Partial Market Foreclosure," Faculty Working Papers 17/05, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.

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