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The Activities of a Monopoly Firm in Adjacent Competitive Markets: Economic Consequences and Implications for Competition Policy

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  • Rey, Patrick
  • Seabright, Paul
  • Tirole, Jean

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 132.

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Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision: 2002
Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:660

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References

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  1. Klemperer, Paul, 1992. "Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview," CEPR Discussion Papers 704, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 145, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  3. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "A Primer on Foreclosure," IDEI Working Papers 203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005.
  4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, December.
  6. Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau, 1988. ""Mix and Match": Product Compatibility without Network Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 221-234, Summer.
  7. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  8. Warren-Boulton, Frederick R, 1974. "Vertical Control with Variable Proportions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 783-802, July/Aug..
  9. Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," NBER Working Papers 2995, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1994. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 841-79, November.
  11. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
  12. Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, 1997. "Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits and Efficiency," Working Paper Series 199, MIT Center for Coordination Science.
  13. Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, 2003. "Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets," Development and Comp Systems 0303005, EconWPA.
  14. Choi, Jay Pil, 1996. "Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation, and the "Leverage Theory."," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1153-81, November.
  15. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-30, March.
  16. Schwartz, M. & Werden, G.J., 1995. "A Quality-Signaling Rationale for Aftermarket Tying," Papers 95-01, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
  17. Schmalensee, Richard, 1973. "A Note on the Theory of Vertical Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 442-49, Part I, M.
  18. Choi, Jay Pil & Stefanadis, Christodoulos, 2001. "Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 52-71, Spring.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Marc Ivaldi, 2005. "Restructuring Railways: In Theory and Practice," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 3(4), pages 3-9, 01.
  2. Rochet, Jean Charles & Tirole, Jean, 2008. "Tying in two-sided markets and the honor all cards rule," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1333-1347, November.
  3. Ioana CHIOVEANU, 2002. "Is Bundling Anticompetitive?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 568.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  4. Ioana Chioveanu, 2008. "Is Bundling Anticompetitive?," Working Papers. Serie AD 2008-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  5. Ivaldi, Marc & Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "The Economics of Unilateral Effects," IDEI Working Papers 222, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.

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