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• Jean Tirole

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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 132.

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Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision: 2002
Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:660

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1. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1992. "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 299-308, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Joseph Farrell and Michael L. Katz., 2000. "Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets," Economics Working Papers E00-286, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Joseph Farrell & Michael Katz, 2000. "Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1027, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
   • Michael Katz & Joseph Farrell, 2000. "Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series CPC99-006, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
   • Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, 2003. "Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets," Development and Comp Systems 0303005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, 2001. "Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets," Industrial Organization 0012001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Farrell, Joseph & Katz, Michael L, 2000. "Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(4), pages 413-32, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509.
5. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," NBER Working Papers 6831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 145, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State. [Downloadable!]
   • Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
7. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1994. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 841-79, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 233, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
   • Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," Working papers 592, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1995. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," NBER Working Papers 3906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Choi, Jay Pil & Stefanadis, Christodoulos, 2001. "Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 52-71, Spring.
9. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
10. Choi, Jay Pil, 1996. "Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation, and the "Leverage Theory."," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1153-81, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Jay Pil Choi, 1995. "Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation and the "Leverage Theory"," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
11. Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau, 1988. ""Mix and Match": Product Compatibility without Network Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 221-234, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Warren-Boulton, Frederick R, 1974. "Vertical Control with Variable Proportions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 783-802, July/Aug.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "A Primer on Foreclosure," IDEI Working Papers 203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "A Primer on Foreclosure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, 1997. "Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits and Efficiency," Working Paper Series 199, MIT Center for Coordination Science. [Downloadable!]
15. Schmalensee, Richard, 1973. "A Note on the Theory of Vertical Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 442-49, Part I, M. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-59, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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