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An exploration in school formation: Income vs. Ability

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  • Alkan, Ahmet
  • Anbarci, Nejat
  • Sarpça, Sinan

Abstract

We study stable school formation among four students that differ in ability and income. In the presence of ability complementarities and school costs to be shared, we identify the conditions under which a stable allocation is efficient, inefficient, nonexistent, and tell who become peers.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 117 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 500-504

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:2:p:500-504

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

Related research

Keywords: School formation; Stable matching; Peer effects; Multilateral bargaining; Assortative matching;

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References

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  1. Stacy Berg Dale & Alan Krueger, 1998. "Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables," Working Papers 788, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
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  3. Eeckhout, Jan, 2000. "On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-8, October.
  4. Jacob M. Markman & Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, 2003. "Does peer ability affect student achievement?," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 527-544.
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  7. Hanushek Eric A & Sarpça Sinan & Yilmaz Kuzey, 2011. "Private Schools and Residential Choices: Accessibility, Mobility, and Welfare," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-34, August.
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  10. Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.F., 2008. "A Model of Partnership Formation," Discussion Paper 2008-103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  11. Weili Ding & Steven F. Lehrer, 2006. "Do Peers Affect Student Achievement in China's Secondary Schools?," NBER Working Papers 12305, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March.
  13. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2000. "Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 119-132, March.
  14. Marek Pycia, 2012. "Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 323-362, 01.
  15. Henderson, Vernon & Mieszkowski, Peter & Sauvageau, Yvon, 1978. "Peer group effects and educational production functions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 97-106, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Ahmet Alkan & Alparslan Tuncay, 2014. "Pairing Games and Markets," Working Papers 2014.48, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

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