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Co-ranking mates: Assortative matching in marriage markets

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  • Legros, Patrick
  • Newman, Andrew

Abstract

We show that co-ranking is the necessary and sufficient condition for assortative matching with strictly nontransferable utility. This condition is equivalent to the GID condition in Legros and Newman (2007) and is a weakening of existing conditions for equilibrium uniqueness.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 106 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 177-179

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:106:y:2010:i:3:p:177-179

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

Related research

Keywords: Nontransferable utility Assignment models;

References

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  1. Eeckhout, Jan, 2000. "On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-8, October.
  2. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
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Cited by:
  1. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Instrumental Cardinal Concerns for Social Status in Two-Sided Matching with Non-Transferable Utility," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 095, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics.
  2. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 094, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics.
  3. Alkan, Ahmet & Anbarci, Nejat & Sarpça, Sinan, 2012. "An exploration in school formation: Income vs. Ability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 500-504.

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