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Co-ranking mates: Assortative matching in marriage markets

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  • Legros, Patrick
  • Newman, Andrew

Abstract

We show that co-ranking is the necessary and sufficient condition for assortative matching with strictly nontransferable utility. This condition is equivalent to the GID condition in Legros and Newman (2007) and is a weakening of existing conditions for equilibrium uniqueness.

Suggested Citation

  • Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew, 2010. "Co-ranking mates: Assortative matching in marriage markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 177-179, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:106:y:2010:i:3:p:177-179
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Clark Simon, 2006. "The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-28, December.
    2. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2007. "Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1073-1102, July.
    3. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    4. Eeckhout, Jan, 2000. "On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-8, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fernanda Estevan & Thomas Gall; Patrick Legros; Andrew F. Newman, 2014. "College Admission and High School Integration," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2014_26, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    2. Alkan, Ahmet & Anbarci, Nejat & Sarpça, Sinan, 2012. "An exploration in school formation: Income vs. Ability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 500-504.
    3. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan S. Pereyra, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?," Papers 2212.02881, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    4. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2017. "Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1507-1534, June.
    5. Demuynck, Thomas & Potoms, Tom, 2020. "Weakening transferable utility: The case of non-intersecting Pareto curves," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    6. Rania Gihleb & Kevin Lang, 2020. "Educational Homogamy and Assortative Mating Have Not Increased," Research in Labor Economics, in: Change at Home, in the Labor Market, and On the Job, volume 48, pages 1-26, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    7. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 18-33, March.
    8. Hector Chade & Jan Eeckhout & Lones Smith, 2017. "Sorting through Search and Matching Models in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(2), pages 493-544, June.
    9. Karpov, Alexander, 2019. "A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 63-65.
    10. Gregory Z. Gutin & Philip R. Neary & Anders Yeo, 2021. "Unique Stable Matchings," Papers 2106.12977, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    11. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2013. "Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 143-156.
    12. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2014. "Instrumental cardinal concerns for social status in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 174-189.
    13. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off ?," Working Papers ECARES 2022-39, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    14. Nicolas Bonneton & Christopher Sandmann, 2023. "Non-Stationary Search and Assortative Matching," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_465, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    15. Thomas Gall, 2017. "Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 51-78, March.
    16. Gutin, Gregory Z. & Neary, Philip R. & Yeo, Anders, 2023. "Unique stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 529-547.
    17. Donghun Yoon, 2018. "The Policy Research for the Improvement of Excessive Marriage Expense in South Korea," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 11(2), pages 44-54, February.

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