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Proportional concessions and the leximin solution

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  • Driesen, Bram

Abstract

In this note we introduce a new axiom for bargaining solutions, named Proportional Concession Monotonicity (PCM), which imposes that no player benefits when all players collectively make proportional concessions with respect to their respective utopia values. We reconsider the leximin solution (Imai, 1983), and obtain an alternative characterization on the basis of PCM.

Suggested Citation

  • Driesen, Bram, 2012. "Proportional concessions and the leximin solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 288-291.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:3:p:288-291
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomson,William & Lensberg,Terje, 2006. "Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027038.
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    9. Driesen, Bram & Perea, Andrés & Peters, Hans, 2011. "The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 58-64, January.
    10. Chang, Chih & Liang, Meng-Yu, 1998. "A characterization of the lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for n=3," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 307-319, May.
    11. Chih Chang & Yan-An Hwang, 1999. "A characterization of the leximin solution of the bargaining problem," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 49(3), pages 395-400, July.
    12. Chun, Youngsub & Peters, Hans, 1991. "The lexicographic equal-loss solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 151-161, October.
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    1. Bram Driesen, 2016. "Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 777-809, April.
    2. Driesen, Bram W., 2012. "The Asymmetric Leximin Solution," Working Papers 0523, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    3. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Axiomatic characterization; Leximin solution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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