Reference Functions and Balanced Concessions in Bargaining
AbstractIn bargaining, agents expect their concessions to be reciprocated. Using the 'reference function' concept of W. Thomson (1981), this paper constructs a class of solutions the outcomes of which lead to balanced concessions by agents as prescribed by the reference function adopted. The Kalai/Smorodinsky (1975) solution arises as a special case. Another solution in this class, which depends on the entire feasible set, is generated by using the center of gravity as the reference function.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 28 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nejat Anbarci & John Boyd, 2008.
"Nash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution,"
0809, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
- Anbarci, Nejat & Boyd III, John H., 2011. "Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 14-22, January.
- Nejat Anbarci & John H. Boyd III, 2008. "Nash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution," Economics Series 2008_11, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
- Younghwan In, 2008. "On the relevance of alternatives in bargaining: generalized average pay-off solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 251-264, June.
- Nejat Anbarci, 1998. "Simple Characterizations of the Nash and Kalai/smorodinsky Solutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 255-261, December.
- Driesen, Bram, 2012.
"Proportional concessions and the leximin solution,"
Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 288-291.
- Jaume García Segarra & Miguel Ginés Vilar, 2011. "Weighted Proportional Losses Solution," ThE Papers 10/21, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2012.
"Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions,"
2012_7, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
- Anbarci, Nejat & Sun, Ching-jen, 2013. "Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 367-376.
- Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2009. "Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions," Economics Series 2009_14, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
- Forgo, F. & Szidarovszky, F., 2003. "On the relation between the Nash bargaining solution and the weighting method," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 108-116, May.
- Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2011. "Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 453-470, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.