This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Reference Functions and Balanced Concessions in Bargaining

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Nejat Anbarci

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In bargaining, agents expect their concessions to be reciprocated. Using the 'reference function' concept of W. Thomson (1981), this paper constructs a class of solutions the outcomes of which lead to balanced concessions by agents as prescribed by the reference function adopted. The Kalai/Smorodinsky (1975) solution arises as a special case. Another solution in this class, which depends on the entire feasible set, is generated by using the center of gravity as the reference function.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28199508%2928%3A3%3C675%3ARFABCI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 28 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 675-82
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:3:p:675-82

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Email:
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://economics.ca/en/membership.php

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2009. "Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions," Economics Series 2009_14, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  2. Younghwan In, 2008. "On the relevance of alternatives in bargaining: generalized average pay-off solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 251-264, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Cannot find something on IDEAS? Encourage the publisher to index it! Instructions.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-21.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.