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Learning from the Metaheuristics: Protocols for Automated Negotiations

Author

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  • Fabian Lang

    (Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg)

  • Andreas Fink

    (Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg)

Abstract

Nowadays, enterprises are more and more interconnected such that operational planning has to consider the different interests of the involved organizations. This may be a challenging and complex task as it is subject to strategic interactions and incomplete information. Automated negotiation by software agents is a powerful tool which can handle these issues and facilitate intercompany planning. Nevertheless, sophisticated negotiation protocols that govern the rules of the negotiation are needed. In this study, we present and evaluate two configurable protocols for multi-issue negotiations, which are inspired by general heuristic optimization algorithms for centralized problems, so-called metaheuristics. The protocols consist of several policy building blocks; these are evaluated with regard to their impact on the negotiation outcome. The evaluation shows that both protocols can efficiently achieve beneficial solutions—even for complex, nonlinear contract spaces—given the parameterization and the configuration of building blocks are chosen appropriately. Furthermore, we elaborate on requirements for appropriate protocol design and find that both protocols adequately comply with the requirements.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabian Lang & Andreas Fink, 2015. "Learning from the Metaheuristics: Protocols for Automated Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 299-332, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9390-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-014-9390-x
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    2. Małgorzata Przybyła-Kasperek, 2019. "Three Conflict Methods in Multiple Classifiers that Use Dispersed Knowledge," International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making (IJITDM), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(02), pages 555-599, March.
    3. Seyed Morsal Ghavami & Mohammad Taleai, 2017. "Towards a conceptual multi-agent-based framework to simulate the spatial group decision-making process," Journal of Geographical Systems, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 109-132, April.
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    5. Usha Kiruthika & Thamarai Selvi Somasundaram & S. Kanaga Suba Raja, 2020. "Lifecycle Model of a Negotiation Agent: A Survey of Automated Negotiation Techniques," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(6), pages 1239-1262, December.

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