Pirates and traders: Some economics of pirate-infested seas
AbstractEven where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate piracy.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 111 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Piracy Violent crime Economies of scale Penalties Moral hazard Self-insurance;
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