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The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract

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  • Peter Leeson

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-009-9403-5
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 139 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 443-459

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:139:y:2009:i:3:p:443-459

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

Related research

Keywords: Pirates; Social contract; Calculus of consent; Constitutional democracy;

References

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  1. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 23-49, June.
  2. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
  3. Mark Roodhouse, 2009. "The invisible hook: the hidden economics of pirates," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(6), pages 973-975.
  4. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Guha, Brishti, 2012. "Pirates and fishermen: Is less patrolling always bad?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 29-38.
  2. James Kostelnik & David Skarbek, 2013. "The governance institutions of a drug trafficking organization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 95-103, July.
  3. Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
  4. Leeson, Peter T. & Coyne, Christopher J., 2012. "Sassywood," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 608-620.
  5. Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2012. "Promoting Cooperation: the Distribution of Reward and Punishment Power," Discussion Papers 2012-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  6. Alexander Fink, 2011. "Under what conditions may social contracts arise? Evidence from the Hanseatic League," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 173-190, June.
  7. Guha, Brishti & Guha, Ashok S., 2011. "Pirates and traders: Some economics of pirate-infested seas," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 147-150, May.
  8. Peter Leeson, 2013. "Gypsy law," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 273-292, June.
  9. Christian Schubert & Leonhard K. Lades, 2012. "Fighting Maritime Piracy: Three Lessons from Pompeius Magnus," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-017, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  10. Leeson, Peter T., 2010. "Rational choice, Round Robin, and rebellion: An institutional solution to the problems of revolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 297-307, March.
  11. Leeson, Peter T., 2011. "Government, clubs, and constitutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 301-308.
  12. Williamson, Claudia R., 2012. "Dignity and development," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 763-771.
  13. Daniel D’Amico, 2012. "Comparative political economy when anarchism is on the table," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 63-75, March.

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