The pricing of bank debt guarantees
AbstractWe analyze the desirability of fair pricing of government guarantees for bank liabilities. Fair pricing is desirable only if the banking sector is sufficiently transparent. In opaque banking systems, fair pricing may exacerbate banks' incentive to take excessive risks.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 108 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Bank debt guarantees Fair pricing Transparency Financial stability;
Other versions of this item:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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