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Severe or gentle bankruptcy law: Which impact on investing and financing decisions?

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  • Blazy, Régis
  • Deffains, Bruno
  • Umbhauer, Gisèle
  • Weill, Laurent

Abstract

This research investigates how legal sanctions prevailing under bankruptcy may impact on debt contracting and on investing decision. We model firms having the opportunity to engage (or not) faulty management. In case of default, the firms may escape costly bankruptcy by reaching a private agreement with the bank. We show that such renegotiation process may depend on the level of severity of bankruptcy law.

Suggested Citation

  • Blazy, Régis & Deffains, Bruno & Umbhauer, Gisèle & Weill, Laurent, 2013. "Severe or gentle bankruptcy law: Which impact on investing and financing decisions?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 129-144.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:34:y:2013:i:c:p:129-144
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2013.02.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Gupta, Jairaj & Gregoriou, Andros, 2018. "Impact of market-based finance on SMEs failure," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 13-25.
    2. Hubert Bruslerie & Luminita Enache, 2023. "The dynamics of leverage of newly controlled target firms: evidence after an acquisition," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 411-445, August.
    3. Régis Blazy & Nirjhar Nigam, 2019. "Corporate insolvency procedures in England: the uneasy case for liquidations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 89-123, February.
    4. de La Bruslerie, Hubert, 2016. "Does debt curb controlling shareholders' private benefits? Modelling in a contingent claim framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 263-282.
    5. Stef, Nicolae, 2022. "How does legal design affect the initiation of a firm's bankruptcy?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    6. Godlewski, Christophe J., 2015. "The dynamics of bank debt renegotiation in Europe: A survival analysis approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 19-31.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate bankruptcy; Credit lending; Interest rate; Moral hazard; Legal sanctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

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