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Solutions au stress financier

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  • Martel, Jocelyn

    (CIRANO)

Abstract

This article presents a survey of the solutions offered to firms in financial distress. The fîrst section examines the role of debt in the firms' financing decisions. In particular, we discuss the impact of the use of debt on the value of the firm and its importance in the presence of asymmetric information and agency costs. The second section presents a discussion of the solutions to financial distress with a particular emphazis on the use of the bankruptcy law. We discuss the functionning of the Canadian bankruptcy law, the problems arising from the use of legal frameworks such as those prevailing in Canada and in the U.S., as well as a number of alternative mechanisms to the existing legal System. Ce survol de la littérature offre un aperçu des différentes solutions au stress financier des entreprises. La première section passe en revue les différents rôles joués par la dette dans le cadre de la politique de financement des entreprises. Nous y discutons, entre autres, de l’impact de l’utilisation de la dette sur la valeur de la firme et de son importance pour réduire les problèmes liés à la présence d’asymétrie d’information ex ante et ex post. La deuxième section traite des solutions au stress financier et plus particulièrement de celle associée à l’utilisation de la loi sur la faillite. Nous y retrouvons une description du fonctionnement de la loi canadienne, des problèmes engendrés par l’utilisation de cadres légaux tels que ceux en vigueur au Canada et aux États-Unis ainsi que de mécanismes alternatifs comme solution au stress financier.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 72 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (mars)
Pages: 51-78

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Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:72:y:1996:i:1:p:51-78

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  3. Fisher, T.C.G. & Martel, J., 1994. "The Creditors' Financial Reorganization Decision: New Evidence from Canadian Data," Cahiers de recherche 9417, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
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