A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 20 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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