This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Baird, Douglas G
Picker, Randal C
Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.

Volume (Year): 20 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 311-49
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:20:y:1991:i:2:p:311-49

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637
Fax: (773) 753-0811
Email:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/order1.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Régis Blazy & Laurent Weill, 2007. "The Impact of Legal Sanctions on Moral Hazard when Debt Contracts are Renegotiable," Working Papers DULBEA 07-06.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. John F. Crean, 2009. "Credit Risk, Default Loss, and the Economics of Bankruptcy," Working Papers tecipa-354, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Elie Appelbaum, 2008. "Incomplete Contracts, Bankruptcy and the Firm’s Capital Structure," Working Papers 2008_01, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. repec:bep:dewple:2001-1-1025 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Efraim Benmelech & Nittai K. Bergman, 2008. "Liquidation Values and the Credibility of Financial Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from U.S. Airlines," NBER Working Papers 14059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, 1991. "A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law," NBER Technical Working Papers 0103, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc data is maintained by each archive holder on its own website. Nothing is held centrally.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.