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• Régis Blazy

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 24 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 447-471
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:24:y:2004:i:4:p:447-471

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1. Régis Blazy & Laurent Weill, 2007. "The Impact of Legal Sanctions on Moral Hazard when Debt Contracts are Renegotiable," Working Papers DULBEA 07-06.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Régis Blazy & Laurent Weill, 2006. "The Impact of Legal Sanctions on Moral Hazard when Debt Contracts are Renegotiable," Working Papers of CREFI-LSF (Centre of Research in Finance - Luxembourg School of Finance) 06-09, CREFI-LSF, University of Luxembourg. [Downloadable!]
   • Régis Blazy & Laurent Weill, 2007. "The Impact of Legal Sanctions on Moral Hazard when Debt Contracts are Renegotiable," Working Papers CEB 07-012.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.