IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecmode/v31y2013icp586-589.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On complex dynamics of monopoly market

Author

Listed:
  • Askar, S.S.

Abstract

The equilibrium state of a bounded rational monopolist model is studied in this paper. It is assumed that the entire demand function is considered based on some market experiments to produce a quantity which maximizes profit. The stability of equilibrium state of the model is discussed. In addition, some complex dynamical behaviours of the model are illustrated.

Suggested Citation

  • Askar, S.S., 2013. "On complex dynamics of monopoly market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 586-589.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:31:y:2013:i:c:p:586-589
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2012.12.025
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999312004531
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econmod.2012.12.025?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Akio Matsumoto & Keiko Nakayama, 2014. "Dynamic monopoly with demand delay," ERSA conference papers ersa14p40, European Regional Science Association.
    2. S. S. Askar & A. Al-khedhairi, 2019. "Analysis of a Four-Firm Competition Based on a Generalized Bounded Rationality and Different Mechanisms," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-12, May.
    3. Akio Matsumoto & Ferenc Szidarovszky, 2021. "Delay dynamics in nonlinear monopoly with gradient adjustment," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 44(2), pages 533-557, December.
    4. Elsadany, A.A., 2017. "Dynamics of a Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality based on relative profit maximization," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 294(C), pages 253-263.
    5. S. S. Askar & Mona F. EL-Wakeel & M. A. Alrodaini, 2018. "Exploration of Complex Dynamics for Cournot Oligopoly Game with Differentiated Products," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-13, February.
    6. Matsumoto, Akio & Szidarovszky, Ferenc, 2014. "Complex dynamics of monopolies with gradient adjustment," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 220-229.
    7. Askar, S.S. & Alshamrani, Ahmad M. & Alnowibet, K., 2015. "Dynamic Cournot duopoly games with nonlinear demand function," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 259(C), pages 427-437.
    8. Askar, S.S. & Alshamrani, Ahmad M. & Alnowibet, K., 2016. "The arising of cooperation in Cournot duopoly games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 273(C), pages 535-542.
    9. Cavalli, Fausto & Naimzada, Ahmad, 2015. "Effect of price elasticity of demand in monopolies with gradient adjustment," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 47-55.
    10. Matsumoto, Akio & Szidarovszky, Ferenc, 2022. "The chaotic monopolist revisited with bounded rationality and delay dynamics," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    11. Georges Sarafopoulos, 2015. "On the complex dynamics of a bounded rational monopolist model," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR), International Hellenic University (IHU), Kavala Campus, Greece (formerly Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology - EMaTTech), vol. 8(1), pages 113-120, August.
    12. Georges SARAFOPOULOS & Kosmas PAPADOPOULOS, 2017. "On A Cournot Duopoly Game With Differentiated Goods, Heterogeneous Expectations And A Cost Function Including Emission Costs," Scientific Bulletin - Economic Sciences, University of Pitesti, vol. 16(1), pages 11-22.
    13. PAPADOPOULOS Kosmas & SARAFOPOULOS Georges, 2019. "Dynamics of a Cournot Game with Differentiated Goods and Asymmetric Cost Functions based on Relative Profit Maximization," European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Bucharest Economic Academy, issue 02, June.
    14. Xiaoliang Li & Jiacheng Fu & Wei Niu, 2023. "Complex dynamics of knowledgeable monopoly models with gradient mechanisms," Papers 2301.01497, arXiv.org.
    15. Askar, S.S., 2014. "The impact of cost uncertainty on Cournot oligopoly game with concave demand function," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 232(C), pages 144-149.
    16. Askar, S.S., 2018. "Tripoly Stackelberg game model: One leader versus two followers," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 328(C), pages 301-311.
    17. Luca Guerrini & Nicolò Pecora & Mauro Sodini, 2018. "Effects of fixed and continuously distributed delays in a monopoly model with constant price elasticity," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 41(2), pages 239-257, November.
    18. Al-Hdaibat, Bashir & Govaerts, Willy & Neirynck, Niels, 2015. "On periodic and chaotic behavior in a two-dimensional monopoly model," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 27-37.
    19. Matsumoto, Akio & Szidarovszky, Ferenc, 2014. "Discrete and continuous dynamics in nonlinear monopolies," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 232(C), pages 632-642.
    20. Li, Xiaoliang & Li, Bo & Liu, Li, 2023. "Stability and dynamic behaviors of a limited monopoly with a gradient adjustment mechanism," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Galbiati, Marco & Soramäki, Kimmo, 2011. "An agent-based model of payment systems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 859-875, June.
    2. Laurent Lamy, 2013. "“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 194-214, June.
    3. Ianni, A., 2002. "Reinforcement learning and the power law of practice: some analytical results," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 203, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    4. ,, 2011. "Manipulative auction design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
    5. Benaïm, Michel & Hofbauer, Josef & Hopkins, Ed, 2009. "Learning in games with unstable equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1694-1709, July.
    6. Dieter Balkenborg & Rosemarie Nagel, 2016. "An Experiment on Forward vs. Backward Induction: How Fairness and Level k Reasoning Matter," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 378-408, August.
    7. William L. Cooper & Tito Homem-de-Mello & Anton J. Kleywegt, 2015. "Learning and Pricing with Models That Do Not Explicitly Incorporate Competition," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 63(1), pages 86-103, February.
    8. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Jianying Qiu, 2006. "Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    9. Ball, Richard, 2017. "Violations of monotonicity in evolutionary models with sample-based beliefs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 100-104.
    10. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2009. "The target projection dynamic," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 708-719, November.
    11. Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Excess payoff dynamics, potential dynamics, and stable games," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    12. Yoo, Seung Han, 2014. "Learning a population distribution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 188-201.
    13. Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Frédéric Koessler & Kene Boun My & Laurent Denant-Boèmont, 2008. "Road Traffic Congestion and Public Information: An Experimental Investigation," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 42(1), pages 43-82, January.
    14. DeJong, D.V. & Blume, A. & Neumann, G., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Other publications TiSEM 4a8b4f46-f30b-4ad2-bb0c-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Alessandro Lizzeri & Marciano Siniscalchi, 2008. "Parental Guidance and Supervised Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(3), pages 1161-1195.
    16. Ilya R. P. Cuypers & Youtha Cuypers & Xavier Martin, 2017. "When the target may know better: Effects of experience and information asymmetries on value from mergers and acquisitions," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 609-625, March.
    17. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
    18. Brit Grosskopf & Ido Erev & Eldad Yechiam, 2006. "Foregone with the Wind: Indirect Payoff Information and its Implications for Choice," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(2), pages 285-302, August.
    19. Salle, Isabelle & Yildizoglu, Murat & Zumpe, Martin & Sénégas, Marc-Alexandre, 2017. "Coordination through social learning in a general equilibrium model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 64-82.
    20. Gilles Grandjean & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2017. "Strongly rational sets for normal-form games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 35-46, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:31:y:2013:i:c:p:586-589. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30411 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.