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Reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting

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  • Krishna, Pravin
  • Mitra, Devashish

Abstract

This paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country. When trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries, we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria - countries may both be protectionist or trade freely with each other. Starting with trade protection in both countries, a unilateral reform in one country is thus shown to bring about a free trade equilibrium (a self-enforcing state) that is consistent with majority voting in both countries.
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  • Krishna, Pravin & Mitra, Devashish, 2008. "Reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1-2), pages 81-93, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:85:y:2008:i:1-2:p:81-93
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    Cited by:

    1. Emily Blanchard & Gerald Willmann, 2007. "Political Stasis or Protectionist Rut? Policy Mechanisms for Trade Reform in a Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2070, CESifo.
    2. Claire H. Hollweg & Daniel Lederman & Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Structural Reforms and Labour-market Outcomes: International Panel-data Evidence," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(7), pages 925-963, July.
    3. Baldwin, Richard, 2011. "21st century regionalism: Filling the gap between 21st century trade and 20th century trade rules," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2011-08, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    4. Blanchard, Emily & Willmann, Gerald, 2011. "Escaping a protectionist rut: Policy mechanisms for trade reform in a democracy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 72-85, September.
    5. Paul Missios & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2017. "Do SouthSouth preferential trade agreements undermine the prospects for multilateral free trade?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(1), pages 111-161, February.
    6. Daiki Kishishita, 2019. "Does high labour mobility always promote trade liberalization?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1223-1247, August.
    7. Baldwin, Richard, 2010. "Unilateral tariff liberalisation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8162, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Richard Baldwin, 2014. "WTO 2.0: governance of global supply-chain trade," Chapters, in: Richard Baldwin & Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja (ed.), A World Trade Organization for the 21st Century, chapter 2, pages 12-47, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Pierre-Louis Vézina, 2014. "Race-to-the-bottom Tariff Cutting," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 444-458, August.
    10. Yasar, Mahmut, 2013. "Political Influence of Exporting and Import-Competing Firms: Evidence from Eastern European and Central Asian Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 154-168.

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    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade

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