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Ownership structure, board composition and the adoption of charter takeover procedures

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  • Bradbury, Michael E.
  • Mak, Y. T.
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VFK-40V4F2V-4/2/0ab9664fd6c49b47c13096bc2f1adfda
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Corporate Finance.

    Volume (Year): 6 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 2 (July)
    Pages: 165-188

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:6:y:2000:i:2:p:165-188

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin

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    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June.
    2. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Partch, M. Megan, 1989. "Managers' voting rights and corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 263-290, December.
    3. Rosenstein, Stuart & Wyatt, Jeffrey G., 1990. "Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 175-191, August.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    6. Jarrell, Gregg A & Brickley, James A & Netter, Jeffry M, 1988. "The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 49-68, Winter.
    7. Agrawal, Anup & Mandelker, Gershon N., 1990. "Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(02), pages 143-161, June.
    8. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
    9. Molz, Rick, 1988. "Managerial domination of boards of directors and financial performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 235-249, May.
    10. Shivdasani, Anil, 1993. "Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 167-198, April.
    11. Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L. & Jarrell, Gregg, 1997. "Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 189-220, June.
    12. Sunil Wahal & Kenneth W. Wiles & Marc Zenner, 1995. "Who Opts Out of State Antitakeover Protection?: The Case of Pennsylvania's SB 1310," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 24(3), Fall.
    13. Brickley, James A & James, Christopher M, 1987. "The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 161-80, April.
    14. Palepu, Krishna G., 1986. "Predicting takeover targets : A methodological and empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 3-35, March.
    15. Bradbury, Michael E., 1990. "The incentives for voluntary audit committee formation," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 19-36.
    16. Martin, Kenneth J & McConnell, John J, 1991. " Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(2), pages 671-87, June.
    17. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-90, June.
    18. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    19. Byrd, John W. & Hickman, Kent A., 1992. "Do outside directors monitor managers? *1: Evidence from tender offer bids," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 195-221, October.
    20. Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Malatesta, Paul H., 1995. "State takeover legislation and share values: The wealth effects of Pennsylvania's Act 36," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 367-382, April.
    21. Jarrell, Gregg A & Bradley, Michael, 1980. "The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 371-407, October.
    22. Pound, John, 1988. "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 237-265, January.
    23. Pound, John, 1992. "On the Motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure: A Study of Corporate Reaction to the Pennsylvania Takeover Law," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 656-72, October.
    24. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
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    Cited by:
    1. Bhabra, Gurmeet Singh, 2007. "Insider ownership and firm value in New Zealand," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 142-154, April.
    2. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00842582 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:hal:cepnwp:hal-00842582 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Dahya, Jay & McConnell, John J., 2005. "Outside directors and corporate board decisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 37-60, March.

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